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Abstract 
For the past 40 years, lie detection has predominantly been studied in the context of police-
suspect and investigative interviews. In their paper, Leach et al. (2016) examined whether niqabs 
or hijabs interfere with the trial judges’ ability to detect deception and concluded that veiling 
enhanced trial judges’ ability to make accurate veracity judgments. In this comment, we argue 
that the conclusions made by Leach et al. are based upon an inaccurate experimental court 
paradigm and suffer from methodological and analytical issues. It is our opinion that the 
applicability of their research findings to real-life court proceedings alongside potential changes 
to court practices and policies based on Leach et al. should be regarded as naïve and 
misinformed.  
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To Veil or Not to Veil, Detecting Lies in The Courtroom: A Comment on Leach et al. (2016) 
During trials, despite the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, 
witnesses can provide false testimony. While some sincerely believe that their memory of an 
event is accurate, although it is factually erroneous (Laney & Loftus, 2013; Schacter & Loftus, 
2013), other witnesses can deliberately attempt to mislead trial judges. However, unlike mistaken 
eyewitness identification, very few studies have been made about deception in courtrooms 
(Fawcett, 2014). Over the past four decades, lie detection has predominantly been studied in the 
context of police-suspect and investigative interviews (Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; Vrij, 2008).  
In their paper, Leach et al. (2016) aimed to study the largely uncharted territory of 
deception in courtrooms, specifically where a witness wears a niqab or hijab. According to Leach 
et al., different jurisdictions assume that wearing a veil that covers the wearer’s face, apart from 
the eyes, hampers the trial judges’ ability to detect deception: 
Judges in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have ruled that witnesses 
may not wear the niqab – a type of face veil – when testifying, in part because they 
believed that it was necessary to see a person’s face to detect deception. (Leach et al., 
2016, p. 401) 
Leach et al. (2016) conducted two empirical studies to examine whether the niqab or hijab 
interferes with trial judges’ ability to detect deception. Their conclusions are clear and 
unequivocal:  
Contrary to the assumptions underlying the court decisions cited earlier, lie detection was 
not hampered by veiling across two studies. In fact, observers were more accurate at 
detecting deception in witnesses who wore niqabs or hijabs than those who did not veil. 
(Leach et al., 2016, p. 407) 
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In this comment, we argue that the conclusions by Leach et al. (2016) are based upon an 
inaccurate experimental court paradigm and suffer from methodological and analytical issues. In 
addition, their conclusion that ‘the data consistently suggested that minimizing visual information 
actually improved participants’ lie detection performance’ (p. 407) appears unwarranted and has 
the potential to influence the outcome of trials adversely. Based on the foregoing, we discuss 
other potential implications of the research findings by Leach et al. in real-life court proceedings.  
The Inaccurate Experimental Court Paradigm 
In order to examine whether niqabs or hijabs interfere with trial judges’ ability to detect 
deception, Leach et al. (2016) stressed the importance of recreating an experimental court 
paradigm consistent with real-life court proceedings. A resounding feature of their experimental 
court paradigm is initiated by the witnesses’ preparation: 
Witnesses were given 2 minutes to prepare their testimony and, as in real trials [emphasis 
added], they were provided with the questions that would be asked by the defense lawyer. 
Once they were prepared, witnesses were randomly assigned to don a black niqab, a black 
hijab, or remain unveiled. In addition, they were asked to wear an opaque black shawl to 
conceal and control for clothing. Veils and shawls were placed on the witnesses by a 
trained research assistant. (Leach et al., 2016, p. 403) 
The study then continues with the hearing, namely the direct examination (examination-
in-chief) and cross-examination:  
Witnesses were interviewed by two female experimenters. To simulate courtroom 
procedures [emphasis added], one experimenter played the role of the sympathetic 
defense lawyer and asked 16 information gathering questions (e.g., ‘Please describe 
everything that you saw the woman do’). The other experimenter conducted a challenging 
cross-examination as the prosecutor and asked seven unanticipated questions (e.g., ‘The 
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police found the man’s laptop. The defendant’s fingerprints were on it. How do you 
explain that?’). (Leach et al., 2016, p. 403) 
However, although Leach et al. (2016) set up a scenario to replicate a witness’s 
preparation as ‘in real trials’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 403) and to ‘simulate courtroom procedures’ 
(Leach et al., 2016, p. 403) for a hearing, their experimental court paradigm bears no relation to 
real-life court proceedings. 
The Witness’s Preparation 
  After being randomly assigned to watch a video of a woman observing a stranger’s bag or 
stealing items from the bag, ‘witnesses were informed that the woman had been accused of theft 
and they were being called to testify on her behalf (i.e., they were to state that they did not see her 
steal anything)’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 403). Then, witnesses received the defense lawyers’ list of 
questions and had two minutes to prepare their testimony. However, in real trials, such a modus 
operandi is completely unrealistic. In fact, several months or years can pass between an event and 
the moment a witness testifies about it. Such delays can weaken emotional reactions and displays 
(Wilson, Gilbert, & Centerbar, 2003) and thereby affect the witness’s credibility (Heath, 2009; 
Heath & Grannemann, 2015). Furthermore, having a two-minute witness preparation without the 
assistance of a defense lawyer lacks consistency with real-life court proceedings in the United 
States and Canada (i.e., extensive witness preparation) as well as in the United Kingdom (i.e., 
forbidden witness preparation). 
In contrast to the United Kingdom where barristers ‘must not rehearse, practise with or 
coach a witness in respect of their evidence’ (Bar Standard Board, 2015, p. 27), lawyers in the 
United States and Canada can extensively prepare their witnesses. Thus, lawyers not only review 
the evidence with their witnesses, but also prepare and rehearse the direct examination and the 
cross-examination. The process may take several hours, or even days. Lawyers go over the 
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questions and practice the direct examination with their witnesses. They also review the topics on 
which the trial judge or the opposing counsel might ask questions and practice the cross-
examination with their witnesses (Mauet, 2013; Posey & Wrightsman, 2005). However, 
preparations and rehearsals can reduce the cognitive cost of lying (Van Bockstaele, Verschuere, 
Moens, Suchotzki, Debey, & Spruyt, 2012) and thereby hamper the trial judge’s ability to detect 
deception (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). In other words, 
the experimental witness’s preparation is inconsistent with a real-life witness’s preparation and 
thus questions the ecological validity of the conclusions made by Leach et al. (2016), notably 
because variations in emotion and cognitive load associated with real-life court proceedings will 
affect the trial judges’ decision as to whether a witness is lying or telling the truth: a significant 
limitation not addressed by Leach et al. 
Before the hearing, witnesses were also randomly assigned to wear a black niqab or a 
black hijab, or remain unveiled. However, not only did Leach et al. (2016) neglect to mention 
whether the witnesses were accustomed to the wearing of a niqab on a day-to-day basis, but one 
can assume that witnesses randomly assigned to wear a niqab did not wear it because of a sincere 
religious belief. Such an experimental court paradigm creates a totally fictitious situation, 
especially so with regards to Canada. In R. v. N.S. (2012), the Supreme Court of Canada called 
into question the Ontario Court of Appel decision R. v. N.S. (2010) and developed a framework 
on the issue of when, if ever, a witness who wears a niqab can be required to remove it: 
... where a niqab is worn because of a sincerely held religious belief, a judge should order 
it removed if the witness wearing the niqab poses a serious risk to trial fairness, there is no 
way to accommodate both rights, and the salutary effects of requiring the witness to 
remove the niqab outweigh the deleterious effects of doing so. (R. v. N.S., 2012, p. 751).  
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Thus, in accordance to R. v. N.S. (2012), if the wish to wear a niqab is not based on a 
sincere religious belief, the witness will be required to remove the niqab while testifying, and not 
because it is necessary to see a person’s face to detect deception as implied by Leach et al. 
(2016). In other words, in real trials, the issue will only arise with witnesses who believe that 
their religion requires them to wear a niqab while testifying in court. However, in the 
experimental witness’s preparation, the novelty of the situation will likely affect the witnesses’ 
emotional reactions and displays (Lewis, Haviland-Jones & Barrett, 2008) and impression 
management processes (Leary, 1996). This will in turn affect the witnesses’ non-verbal 
behaviour, an overlooked limitation considering that Leach et al. examine the assumption that 
wearing a veil that covers the wearer’s face, apart from the eyes, hampers the trial judges’ ability 
to detect deception. This characteristic of the experimental witnesses’ preparation further calls 
into question the ecological validity of the conclusions made by Leach et al.  
The Hearing 
After the witness’s preparation, one experimenter asked the witness 16 information-
gathering questions (e.g., ‘Please describe everything that you saw the woman do.’) and another 
experimenter asked the witness seven unanticipated questions (e.g., ‘The police found the man’s 
laptop. The defendant’s fingerprints were on it. How do you explain that?’). However, Leach et 
al. (2106) failed to simulate courtroom procedures for a hearing, especially so with regards to the 
cross-examination. In real-life court proceedings, direct examination is not always followed by 
cross-examination. However, when a cross-examination is conducted, the goal is generally to tell 
the lawyers’ side of the story: 
To begin with, why are you cross-examining the witness in the first place? The point of 
cross is not to get information from the witness [emphasis added]. The point of cross is not 
to get the witness to change his story. And most of the time, the point of cross is not to 
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destroy the witness with contradictions and clever impeachment. The point of cross is to let 
you – the lawyer – tell your side of the case so the witness has to agree that what you say is 
true. (McElhaney, 1997, p. 82) 
To conduct successful cross-examinations –  while their approach may vary depending on 
their goal, their style, and the communication skills of the witnesses – lawyers will generally use 
short leading questions that call for a yes or no answer: 
Not only are leading questions perfectly permissible on cross-examination, but on cross-
examination we must ask nothing but [emphasis added] leading questions. Our whole aim 
on cross-examination is to grab the witness by the collar and take him where we want him 
to go. (Younger, 1976, p. 294)   
Thus, to simulate courtroom procedures, the experimenter should have asked short leading 
questions that call for a yes or no answer and not open-ended questions to get information from 
the witness (e.g., ‘The police found the man’s laptop. The defendant’s fingerprints were on it. 
How do you explain that?’). This is an error within any courtroom scenario where there is a 
cross-examination. Even if generally accepted principles promote the use of open-ended 
questions over leading questions in investigative interview settings (Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, 
& Esplin, 2008; Milne & Bull, 2003; Read, Powell, Kebbell, & Milne, 2009), this is not the kind 
of question generally asked in cross-examination. Furthermore, questions asked in direct 
examination have many goals (e.g., to introduce witnesses and ask background questions, set the 
scene and recreate the action, and address the weaknesses of a witness before the opponent is able 
to), but to gather information is generally not one of them (Baldwin, 2013). Thus, the aim by 
Leach et al. (2016) to study deception in courtrooms within an experimental court paradigm bears 
more resemblance to investigative interview settings. This is a significant limitation not 
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addressed by Leach et al., the more so considering that open-ended questions improve deception 
detection accuracy in investigative interview settings (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). 
Considering that the unanticipated nature of open-ended questions also improves deception 
detection accuracy in investigative interviews settings (Vrij, Fisher & Blank, 2015), the overall 
accuracy rates reported by Leach et al. (2016) are highly unlikely to be representative of what 
happens in real-life court proceedings. In fact, in real-life court proceedings, if cross-examination 
is prepared and rehearsed, as it often is in the United States and Canada, defendants will know the 
topics on which the judge or the opposing counsel might ask questions. Unanticipated open-
ended questions are even more improbable because of the disclosure of evidence, a basic 
principle in criminal proceedings that helps to prepare and rehearse cross-examinations of 
defense lawyers’ witnesses. 
Furthermore, in Leach et al. (2016), participants asked to decide whether the witnesses in 
the video footages were lying or telling the truth could not ask questions directly to them. As 
such, this experimental court paradigm creates a fictitious situation, especially so with regards to 
Canada where administrative, civil, and criminal trials are mostly adjudicated by trial judges 
without juries and where, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, trial judges should be 
actively involved in trials: 
… it is clear that judges are no longer required to be as passive as they once were; to be 
what I call sphinx judges. We now not only accept that a judge may intervene in the 
adversarial debate, but also believe that it is sometimes essential for him to do so for justice 
in fact to be done. Thus a judge may and sometimes must ask witnesses questions, interrupt 
them in their testimony and if necessary call them to order. (Brouillard Also Known As 
Chatel v. The Queen, 1985, p. 44) 
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Considering that a significant increase in overall accuracy rates is observed when 
questioning is used strategically (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005; Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Levine, Shaw, & Shulman, 2010), the overall accuracy rates 
reported by Leach et al. (2016) are unlikely to be an actual representation of what happens in 
actual court proceedings, the more so considering the base rate of liars versus truth tellers in 
Leach et al., which is also likely to be largely unrepresentative of the base rate of liars versus 
truth tellers in actual court proceedings. 
In the experimental court paradigm by Leach et al. (2016), witnesses were not plaintiffs in a 
civil case as in Muhammad v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car (2006), complainants in a criminal case as 
in R. v. N.S. (2010), or defendants in a criminal case as in The Queen v. D.(R.) (2013); three 
judicial decisions presented as pivotal in the assumption that Leach et al. applied to the 
experimental court paradigm (i.e., that niqabs interfere with the trial judges’ ability to detect 
deception). They were, in fact, selfless witnesses devoid of any relationship with the 
complainants or the defendants. In other words, in real-life court proceedings, selfless witnesses 
generally have nothing to win and nothing to lose if they tell the truth. On the contrary, if they lie, 
they may face a criminal charge of perjury associated with a fine, a prison sentence, or both 
(Farmer & Hancock, 2014). Therefore, it is safe to hypothesize that selfless witnesses will be 
more truthful, and trial judges will show a stronger truth bias against that category of witnesses 
than against defendants facing prison in criminal cases or plaintiffs facing bankruptcy in civil 
cases, thus affecting the base rate of liars versus truth tellers and the overall accuracy rates 
(Burgoon & Levine, 2010; Levine, Clare, Green, Serota & Park, 2014), which can also be 
affected by the oath that witnesses take before testifying (Jacquemet, Luchini, Rosaz & Shogren, 
2015; Talwar & Crossman, 2012), another key component of real-life court proceedings missing 
in the experimental court paradigm by Leach et al. 
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 To conclude, video footage generated and used in Study 1 and Study 2 have no 
relationship to real-life court proceedings. Leach et al. (2016) did not set up a scenario that 
replicated a witness’s preparation as ‘in real trials’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 403) nor did they 
‘simulate courtroom procedures’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 403) for a hearing. This is a significant 
limitation considering that Leach et al. assert that the ‘two studies reported here provide unique 
tests of the behavioral assumptions underlying important courts decisions in the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Canada’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 408). Therefore, the authors’ research 
findings are based upon an inaccurate experimental court paradigm that undermines their claim 
that ‘In addition to the potential policy implications concerning the wearing of a niqab or hijab on 
the stand, the studies reinforce the value that behavioral science data have for informing 
judiciaries’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 408). 
The Methodological Issues 
 Not only is the experimental court paradigm inconsistent with real-life court proceedings, 
the conclusions drawn from the results by Leach et al. (2016) suffer from methodological and 
analytical issues, which hinder their claim that ‘niqabs do not interfere with – and may, in fact, 
improve – the ability to detect deception’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 401) of trial judges  – namely, 
issues regarding the use of ‘forced choice’ of cues to deception and their use of signal detection 
theory. 
‘Forced choice’ of cues to deception.  
In Study 1, the participants were asked to decide whether the witnesses in the video 
footages were lying or telling the truth, to indicate the confidence of each of their decisions with 
a scale from 0% (not at all confident) to 100% (extremely confident) and to choose the cues they 
used to make their decision from a list of diagnostic and non-diagnostic verbal and non-verbal 
cues to deception. The ‘forced choice’ of cues to deception may have hindered the reporting of 
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the actual cues used by the participants to detect deception in courtrooms. That is, participants 
may have been using cues not provided within the list determined by the experimenters. In 
addition, such an experimental court paradigm does not reflect the way in which trial judges (at 
least) make veracity judgments  –  that is, without a predetermined list of diagnostic and non-
diagnostic verbal and non-verbal cues to deception. However, by allowing open-ended responses, 
the participants would have been able to provide cues that are not only specific to that found 
within previous literature (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016). This is an overlooked 
methodological issue considering that the study of deception in courtrooms is largely uncharted 
territory, even more in the specific context where a witness wears a niqab or hijab. In other 
words, before attempts to test an assumption with inferential statistics, researchers should have a 
thorough understanding of the phenomenon under study (Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison & 
Ferrara, 2002; Rozin, 2001).  
Moreover, Leach et al. (2016) neglect to mention whether the experimenters who 
determined the list of diagnostic and non-diagnostic verbal and non-verbal cues to deception were 
blinded to the hypothesis of their study. In addition, it is unclear whether the experimenters who 
singled out the 60 video clips evenly distributed into the six conditions (liars vs. truth tellers, and 
niqab vs. hijab vs. no veil) were blinded to the liars versus truth tellers condition. If not blinded, a 
bias might have affected the confection of the list and the selection of the 60 video clips (e.g., 
selecting unconvincing liars in the niqab and hijab conditions and convincing liars in the no veil 
condition). Given the above, their conclusions that ‘witnesses in niqabs revealed significantly 
more verbal than nonverbal cues’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 408) and that ‘participants were more 
likely to base their decisions on verbal cues than nonverbal cues when viewing witnesses from 
this group’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 408) are unjustified, not only because of the use of ‘forced 
choice’ cues to deception, but perhaps because of the biased list of diagnostic and non-diagnostic 
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verbal and non-verbal cues to deception and 60 video clips. In other words, the actual cues 
displayed by the witnesses and used by the participants to detect deception in courtrooms are 
unknown. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that, in Study 1, only the diagnostic verbal and non-verbal cues 
to deception were analysed. The authors disregarded the non-diagnostic cues to deception and 
justified the decision on the rationale that ‘including known non-diagnostic cues in the analysis 
would have unnecessarily impeded the likelihood of uncovering significant effects’ (Leach et al., 
2016, p. 405). However, recent research has demonstrated that some individuals show higher 
accuracy in veracity judgments without citing diagnostic cues to deception, while actually citing 
more non-diagnostic or assumed ‘invalid’ cues to deception (Jupe, Akehurst, Vernham, & Allen, 
2016). Therefore, the exclusion of non-diagnostic verbal and non-verbal cues to deception 
appears to be an arbitrary decision in relation to the potential research findings. The fact that the 
actual cues displayed by the witnesses and used by the participants to detect deception in 
courtrooms are unknown is a limitation downplayed by Leach et al. (2016). 
 It is also worth noting that, in Study 2, participants from the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands were not asked to provide the verbal and non-verbal cues to deception that they used 
to decide whether witnesses in the video footage were lying or telling the truth. However, if 
Study 2 was to serve as a direct replication of Study 1, as Leach et al. (2016) presented it, the 
design of Study 1 should have also asked participants from the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands for the verbal and non-verbal cues to deception that they used when making their 
veracity judgements. Therefore, Study 2 is not a direct replication of Study 1, and its design 
downplays the already unwarranted conclusions of Study 1 related to cues displayed by the 
witnesses and used by the participants to detect deception. 
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Signal Detection Theory 
In Study 1 and Study 2, the results are furthered with analysis drawn from signal detection 
theory (SDT; MacMillan & Creelman, 1991; Meissner & Kassin, 2002). An SDT analysis 
calculates the response bias (β) and discrimination accuracy (d’), which is a measure of pure 
sensitivity achieved by measuring the signal and the noise means in standard deviation units. 
Such calculations correct for response bias and guessing. Positive values suggest an ability to 
discriminate liars from truth tellers, and negative values suggest response confusion. 
Discrimination accuracy analysis includes the calculation of hits, misses, false alarms, and correct 
rejections. A hit is a lie correctly identified as a lie, a miss is a lie incorrectly identified as a truth, 
a false alarm is a truth incorrectly identified as a lie, and a correct rejection is a truth correctly 
identified as a truth. Accurate decisions are composed of hits and correct rejections, and 
inaccurate decisions are composed of misses and false alarms. However, Leach et al. (2016) state 
that only hits and false alarms were calculated, which only draw partial conclusions based on an 
analysis from decisions made where they correctly identified a lie as a lie and incorrectly 
identified a truth as a lie. Given the above, the authors’ reported discrimination accuracy (d’) 
analysis appears only to be partially completed in relation to the potential research findings. 
In addition, irrespective of the veiling condition, the research findings by Leach et al. 
(2016) highlighted truth biases with participants demonstrating an accuracy rate of .72 for truths 
and .38 for lies (d = 1.66) in Study 1 and .71 for truths and .39 for lies (d = 1.52) in Study 2. The 
truth biases are further highlighted by the reported response bias (β). The participants in Study 1 
exhibited a truth bias in the hijab condition but not in the niqab or no veil condition. In Study 2, 
the participants exhibited a truth bias in the hijab and niqab condition but not in the no veil 
condition. Considering that the truth bias is related to the veracity effect, which can impede 
overall accuracy rates (Levine, Park & McCornack, 1999), it is possible that part of the difference 
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in Study 1 and Study 2 between overall accuracy rates in the veil conditions and in the no veil 
condition may in fact be down to a truth bias, a limitation downplayed by Leach et al. 
 To conclude, the research findings and inferences drawn by Leach et al. (2016) suffer 
from methodological and analytical issues that further undermine their claim that ‘in addition to 
the potential policy implications of their research concerning the wearing of a niqab or hijab on 
the stand, the studies reinforce the value that behavioural science data have for informing 
judiciaries’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 408). Since their conclusions are also based on an inaccurate 
experimental court paradigm, it is our opinion that the applicability of their research findings to 
real-life court proceedings alongside potential changes to court practices and policies based on 
Leach et al. should be regarded as naïve and misinformed. 
Discussion 
In their paper, Leach et al. (2016) examined whether the niqab or hijab interfere with the 
trial judges’ ability to detect deception. However, while we applaud the authors for opening a 
discussion about deceptive courtroom interactions, we argue that the conclusions by Leach et al. 
are based upon an inaccurate experimental court paradigm and suffer from methodological and 
analytical issues. Such weaknesses raise serious concerns with regards to the clear and 
unequivocal assertion that ‘the two studies reported here provide unique tests of the behavioral 
assumptions underlying important courts decisions in the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Canada’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 408). Furthermore, their conclusion that ‘the data consistently 
suggested that minimizing visual information actually improved participants’ lie detection 
performance’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 407) appears unwarranted and has the potential to influence 
the outcome of trials adversely. 
Psychology and law scholars play a crucial role in the development of evidence-based 
practices and policies. Racial biases (Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Michel, Caldara, & Roission, 
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2006), witness identification (Erickson, Lampinen, & Moore, 2016; Wixted, Read, & Lindsay, 
2016), eyewitness memory (Brainerd, 2013; Loftus, 2005) and false confession (Leo, 2009; Shaw 
& Porter, 2015) are a few examples of where psychological science has triggered changes in the 
judicial system. However, while some psychology and law research domains sometimes take 
years to have an impact upon institutionalized practices and policies – sometimes even with only 
limited success – a single peer-reviewed paper on credibility assessment or deception detection, 
such as Leach et al. (2016), has a potential to influence the outcome of trials adversely that 
should not be overlooked. In Canada, for example, the way trial judges assess witnesses’ 
credibility provides considerable insights into such potential impact. 
According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the highest court in Canada, credibility 
assessment is ‘a matter that must be left to the common sense of the trier of fact’ (R. v. François, 
1994, p. 839). Credibility assessment ‘must always be the product of the judge or jury's view of 
the diverse ingredients it has perceived at trial, combined with experience, logic and an intuitive 
sense of the matter’ (R. v. Marquard, 1993, p. 248). Demeanour is one of the diverse elements 
that trial judges can take into account:  
The trier of fact will observe the witness’s demeanour and the way she answers the 
questions. The result may be that the trier of fact does not accept the witness’s evidence, 
accepts only part of her evidence, or reduces the weight accorded to her evidence. (R. v. 
D.A.I., 2012, para 72) 
The way trial judges assess credibility has been met with severe criticism. For example, 
Porter and Ten Brinke (2009) described how credibility assessments can be biased by non-
diagnostic or assumed ‘invalid’ cues to deception (e.g., babyfacedness and gaze aversion). In 
other words, trials’ outcome can be biased by common sense and stereotypes, a phenomenon well 
documented since the 1960’s (Garfinkel, 1967) and still highly relevant in psychology and law 
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research (Baker, Porter, Ten Brinke & Mundy, 2016; Beety, 2013; Dumas & Testé, 2006; 
Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006; Porter & Ten Brinke, 2009; Seelau & 
Seelau, 2005; Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991). More recently, Denault (2015) highlighted real 
case law where non-diagnostic or assumed ‘invalid’ cues to deception (e.g., gaze, shrug, and 
flush) affected the assessment of witnesses’ credibility. Considering that ‘credibility is an issue 
that pervades most trials, and at its broadest may amount to a decision on guilt or innocence’ (R. 
v. Handy, 2002, para 115), Denault (2015) advocated that particular attention should be paid to 
notions about credibility assessment and deception detection that trial judges come across during 
training and are subjected to in the media. It is especially relevant as those notions can affect – 
consciously or unconsciously – the way they assess credibility (Porter et Ten Brinke, 2009) and 
may be prevalent throughout their careers, without knowing they are non-diagnostic or assumed 
‘invalid’ cues to deception. 
According to the Supreme Court of Canada, credibility assessment ‘does not always lend 
itself to precise and complete verbalization’ (R. v. R.E.M., 2008, para 49). In other words, trial 
judges do not have the obligation to explicitly mention in their judgments all the factors they take 
into consideration when assessing credibility. Furthermore, even if they cite non-diagnostic or 
assumed ‘invalid’ cues to deception in their judgments, chances are their decisions will be upheld 
‘in the absence of a palpable and overriding error’ (R. v. Gagnon, 2006, para 20) because, 
according to the Supreme Court of Canada, ‘the trial judge has the advantage, denied to the 
appellate court, of seeing and hearing the evidence of witnesses’ (R. v. W. (R.), 1992, p. 131). In 
other words, trial judges receive very little, if any, feedback on their veracity judgments. What is 
more detrimental is when a trial judge makes a personal decision with regards to an individual’s 
truthfulness (in particular when the trial judge believes the individual to be a liar), and the 
individual is subsequently convicted of a crime, the cues used by the trial judge are likely to be 
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reinforced. This reinforcement of non-diagnostic or assumed ‘invalid’ cues to deception may 
span decades of service.   
Furthermore, since trial judges are limited in their understanding of lie detection research 
(Strömwall & Granhag, 2003) and science in general (Kozinski, 2015; Chin & Dallen, 2016), and 
some even attended pseudoscientific training (Denault, 2015; Denault, Larivée, Plouffe, & 
Plusquellec, 2015), we see no reason why trial judges would not, in good faith, accept the 
conclusion drawn by Leach et al. (2016) that ‘the data consistently suggested that minimizing 
visual information actually improved participants’ lie detection performance’ (Leach et al., 2016, 
p. 407) and start paying less attention to witnesses’ and lawyers’ facial expressions. However, 
accepting the conclusion without an understanding of the limitations addressed by Leach et al., 
the other shortcomings we highlighted in this comment as well as pivotal concepts about lie 
detection and social interactions would be detrimental. The benefits of paying less attention to 
witnesses’ and lawyers’ facial expressions are neither theoretical nor empirically grounded 
arguments.  
The function of witnesses’ and lawyers’ facial expressions goes well beyond the issue of lie 
detection. Being the major vector of communication, the face plays a central role in social 
interactions (Madal & Awasthi, 2015; Russell & Fernandez-Dols, 1997) and offers meaningful 
information about others such as intentions (Morris & Keltner, 2000; Pietroni, Van Kleef, De 
Dreu, & Pagliaro, 2008) and emotions (Du, Tao, & Martinez, 2014; Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, & 
Schyns, 2005). The face, therefore, plays a major role in shaping trial interactions (i.e., direct 
examinations, cross-examinations, or arguments) just as it does with any other social interaction 
(Frith, 2009; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). In other words, since lie detection is far from 
systematically being at the heart of every administrative, civil, and criminal trial, paying less 
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attention to witnesses’ and lawyers’ facial expressions could result in consequences that go far 
beyond the initial problem it is intended to solve. 
Furthermore, while trial judges can use non-diagnostic or assumed ‘invalid’ cues to 
deception throughout their careers, the explicit mention of those cues in their judgments can 
create legal precedents for other trial judges to follow, even if those cues are contrary to scientific 
consensus. For example, Denault, Delmas, and Rochat (2016) highlighted how a set of dubious 
credibility assessment criteria put forward in a 1986 arbitration ruling have been used up until the 
current day by other arbitrators, including one very unusual criterion initially presented by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1897: 
Witness who testifies to an affirmative is to be credited in preference to one who testifies to 
a negative, magis creditur duobus testibus affirmantibus quam mille negantibus, because he 
who testifies to a negative may have forgotten a thing that did happen, but it is not possible 
to remember a thing that never existed. (Lefeunteum v Beaudoin, 1897, p. 93) 
Thus, while some psychology and law research subjects might take years to have an impact 
upon institutionalized practices and policies in court, it is important not to underestimate how 
easy and quickly notions about credibility assessment and deception detection that trial judges 
come across during training and are subjected to in the media, or in a single peer-review paper on 
credibility assessment or deception detection, can adversely influence the outcome of trials. To 
set a legal precedent, it only takes one lawyer who uses the research findings and conclusions 
drawn by Leach et al. (2106) to argue that niqabs improve the trial judges’ ability to detect 
deception and one trial judge from the United States, the United Kingdom, or Canada who does 
not understand the extent of the limitations within Leach et al., the other shortcomings we 
highlighted in this comment, and pivotal concepts about lie detection and social interactions. 
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 For example, Leach et al. (2016) concluded that: ‘Discrimination between lie- and truth-
tellers was no better than guessing in the latter group, replicating previous research findings 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006). It was only when witnesses wore veils (i.e., hijabs or niqabs) that 
observers performed above chance levels’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 407). However, even if the 
overall accuracy rates reported by the authors in the niqab (.55 in Study 1, .57 in Study 2) and 
hijab conditions (.58 in Study 1, .59 in Study 2) are above chance, they are very weak. The 
average overall accuracy rates in deception detection research are approximately .54 (Aamodt & 
Mitchell, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006), where .50 is the overall accuracy rate of chance, and, 
compared to the niqab and hijab conditions, similar or better overall accuracy rates have been 
achieved with training (Driskell, 2012; Hauch, Sporer, Michael & Meissner, 2014; Shaw, Porter, 
& Ten Brinke, 2013). A significant increase in overall accuracy rates is also observed with the 
use of different techniques such as using contextual information (Blair, Levine, & Shaw, 2010) 
and strategic interrogative questioning (Levine et al., 2010) as well as the strategic use of 
evidence (Hartwig et al., 2006).  
Although they are not uncommon, the overall accuracy rates reported by Leach et al. (2016) 
raise intriguing questions about the accuracy of their conclusion that ‘the data consistently 
suggested that minimizing visual information actually improved participants’ lie detection 
performance’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 407). In other words, according to Leach et al., the overall 
accuracy rates should be higher in the niqab condition than in the hijab condition and be higher in 
the hijab condition than in the no veil condition. However, while they are higher in the hijab 
condition (.58 in Study 1, .59 in Study 2) than in the no veil condition (.52 in Study 1, .51 in 
Study 2), the overall accuracy rates are higher in the hijab condition (.58 in Study 1, .59 in Study 
2) than in the niqab condition (.55 in Study 1, .57 in Study 2). The accuracy rates when there are 
more facial cues (i.e., in the hijab condition) are higher than when there are fewer facial cues (i.e., 
To Veil or Not to Veil, Detecting Lies in The Courtroom 21 
in the niqab condition). This is inconsistent with the conclusion made by Leach et al. 
Furthermore, since the hijab covers the neck, ears, and hairs, the no veil condition primarily has, 
according to the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman & Friesen, 1978), two more facial cue 
than the hijab condition – that is, the neck tightener (AU21) and swallowing (AU80). Therefore, 
it would be more accurate to say that data consistently suggested that minimizing the view of the 
neck improved participants’ lie detection performance, not to mention that, contrary to other lie 
detection studies (Leal, Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2010; Suchotzki, Verschuere, Crombez, & De 
Houwer, 2013), the accuracy rates of each participant were averaged to calculate the overall 
accuracy rates, resulting in a decrease of the within-subject variance and, in turn, of the mean 
square error (Abelson, 1995; Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). This methodological choice resulted in an 
overestimation of the effect sizes reported by Leach et al. 
 Based on the aforementioned, the standard procedure would be to adapt the experimental 
court paradigm and to complete a reanalysis of the data. However, whereas research goals are to 
inform members of the judiciary, we see no purpose of doing so at this point because, contrary to 
what is implied by Leach et al. (2016), the assumption they want to test (i.e., that niqabs interfere 
with the trial judges’ ability to detect deception) is not consistent with actual courtroom 
assumptions, especially so with regards to Canada.   
 Consider R. v. N.S. (2012) where the Supreme Court of Canada developed a framework 
on the issue of when, if ever, a witness who wears a niqab can be required to remove it. When the 
part of the framework on the right to a fair trial was addressed, the Supreme Court of Canada 
principally concluded that the niqab may impede the cross-examination by the lawyer and the 
credibility assessment by the trial judge: two concepts distinct from the concept of deception 
detection as it is referred to in Leach et al. (2016): 
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On the record before us, I conclude that there is a strong connection between the ability to 
see the face of a witness and a fair trial. Being able to see the face of a witness is not the 
only – or indeed perhaps the most important – factor in cross-examination or accurate 
credibility assessment. But its importance is too deeply rooted in our criminal justice 
system to be set aside absent compelling evidence. (R. v. N.S., 2012, pp. 744-745) 
More specifically, in R. v. N.S. (2012) and R. v. N.S. (2010) – the two Canadian decisions 
cited by Leach et al. (2016) – the word ‘lie’ (and ‘lie detection’) is not mentioned, and the word 
‘deception’ (and ‘deception detection’) is not presented as it is referred to in Leach et al. R. v. 
N.S. (2012) mentions it only once when referring to the fact that the niqab may impede cross-
examination by the lawyer: ‘Non-verbal communication can provide the cross-examiner with 
valuable insights that may uncover uncertainty or deception, and assist in getting at the truth’ 
(para. 24). In other words, the niqab may impede the lawyer’s cross-examination and the trial 
judge’s credibility assessment, two actual courtroom assumptions not in line with the assumption 
that Leach et al. wanted to test (i.e., that niqabs interfere with the trial judges’ ability to detect 
deception). 
Thus, with regards to Canada, the authors’ claim that ‘banning the niqab because it 
interferes with one’s ability to determine whether the speaker is lying or telling the truth is not 
supported by science’ (Leach et al., 2016, p. 408) is tendentious. The Supreme Court of Canada 
did not ban the niqab. Irrespective of the conclusions drawn regarding the issue of when, if ever, 
a witness who wears a niqab can be required to remove it is the equivalent of a ban, the Supreme 
Court of Canada did not conclude that the niqab interferes with the trial judges’ ability to detect 
deception as it is referred to in Leach et al. (2016). The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that 
the niqab may impede trial judges’ ability to assess credibility. Even if lie detection scholars 
regularly use them interchangeably, deception detection is not a synonym of credibility 
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assessment. By definition, deception is ‘a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without 
forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to be untrue’ (Vrij, 
2008, p. 15). Credibility ‘incorporates competence, or the perceived ability to accurately recall 
and event, and trustworthiness, and the perceived ability to tell the truth’ (Tabak & Klettke, 2014, 
p. 47). This confusion is not unexpected considering that Leach et al. uses ‘lie’ and ‘deception’ 
interchangeably, two other terms that are not synonyms (Galasinski, 2000). 
Furthermore, such an adaptation of the experimental court paradigm and the completion of 
a re-analysis of the data would take several months or years, a period during which Leach et al. 
(2016) has the potential to cause irremediable harm to the judicial system. Therefore, the 
objective of this comment was to immediately expose the flaws of a peer-reviewed paper that will 
likely be brought to the attention of trial judges. This clarification is all the more important 
considering that Leach et al. received media attention, including that of major Canadian online 
newspapers (Hopper, 2016; Mercier, 2016), including one where a citation attributed to Leach 
was that ‘There’s concrete data from over 500 people showing that, in fact, the courts were 
incorrect’ (Hopper, 2016), a citation that has the power to mislead the general public as well as 
judicial professionals. However, Leach et al. do not offer compelling evidence to set aside the 
‘deeply rooted presumption in our legal system that seeing a witness’s face is important to a fair 
trial, by enabling effective cross-examination and credibility assessment’ (R. v. N.S., 2012, p. 
728). 
Conclusively, since deception in courtrooms is largely uncharted territory, future research 
should establish research hypotheses relevant to real-life court proceedings, highlighting the 
importance to establish an effective dialogue between scholars and judicial professionals. 
However, before any attempts to test an assumption with inferential statistics, descriptive 
research to understand the phenomenon of deception in courtrooms should be conducted (Park et 
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al., 2002; Rozin, 2001). While this comment is indeed a very critical appraisal of the research by 
Leach et al. (2016), it is done with the intention of maintaining the integrity of evidence-based 
practices in courtrooms. To echo Feeley (2013), simple solutions often fail, so, while always 
allowing the wearing of a niqab in the courtroom, or, for that matter, always requiring the niqab 
to be removed, may simplify the debate around an already sensitive subject within particular 
jurisdictions, it is important for psychology and law scholars to acknowledge that consequences 
of evidence based practice that they recommend can exceed their area of expertise. Such research 
findings may lessen political, sociological, and cultural implications of evidence based practice 
and may in fact be detrimental to justice itself. 
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